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PATENT LAW-HUMAN-MADE, GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED, LIVING MICROORGANISM
CONSTITUTES A "MANUFACTURE" OR "COMPOSITION OF
MATTER" UNDER TITLE 35 U.S.C. § 101
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303 (1980).
On June 7, 1972, Ananda M. Chakrabarty filed a patent application
assigned to the General Electric Company seeking claims to a bacte-
rium of the genus Pseudomonas, which he had created by the use of
genetic engineering techniques. The bacterium possessed capabilities
not present in any naturally occurring bacteria which allowed it to
break down multiple components of crude oil.1
Among the thirty-six claims asserted in the application, the Patent
Examiner allowed those for the process used in creating the bacteria2
and for a floatable carrier inoculated with the organism, but rejected
claims for the bacterium itself on the ground that it was a "product of
nature".' Chakrabarty appealed to the Patent and Trademark Office
Board of Appeals which, in an unreported decision, concluded that the
bacterium was not a "product of nature" but rejected the claim on the
basis that the bacterium was alive.' The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (C.C.P.A.) reversed the Board's decision' on the authority of
its holding in In Re Bergy' wherein it was stated that the fact that a
microorganism is alive is not significant to the patent laws.?
The C.C.P.A. then vacated its judgment in the case' and consolidat-
ed it with In Re Bergil in order to reconsider its decisions in light of
the recent United States Supreme Court holding of Parker v. Flook.0
The reversals were reaffirmed in both cases."
The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks sought and was
granted certiorari to the United States Supreme Court" which, in a 5-4
decision, affirmed the C.C.P.A. ruling and held that the language of
'Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).t Process claims may be sustained independently of product patent claims as long as
the product is not described "exclusively in terms of its use or function." Philip Sitton
Septic Tank Co. v. Honer, 274 F.2d 811, 813 (10th Cir. 1959).
'Brief for Respondent at 8, n.3, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
4d.
'In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 43 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
'563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
'Id. at 1038.
'In re Chakrabarty, 571 .F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978), cert. dismissed sub nom. Banner v.
Chakrabarty, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
'In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438
U.S. 902 (1978).
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
"In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (1979).
"Parker v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
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35 U.S.C. § 101, which enumerates patentable subject matter, covered
the bacterium and was, therefore, entitled to patent protection.5
THE INVENTION
In making the bacterium for which the patent application entitled
"Microorganisms Having Multiple, Compatible Degradative Energy-
Generating Plasmids and Preparations Thereof" was sought, Chakra-
barty discovered the means whereby two or more cellular components
called "plasmids"" capable of breaking down separate components of
crude oil could be transferred into a single Pseudomonas cell." The
purpose of the invention was to devise a more efficient organism for
use in cleaning up oil spills. When a mixture of several species of natu-
rally occurring bacteria capable of degrading single components of oil
was used to fight oil spills, the results were unsatisfactory. Numerous
bacteria would die leaving the majority of the spill unattacked."6
In his research Chakrabarty discovered that the genes controlling
the synthesis of enzymes responsible for the degradation of crude oil
were located in plasmids of certain bacteria. Normally, each bacterium
contains only one plasmid, which provides for the breakdown of only
one part of oil (e.g., camphor or octane). These different plasmids
were not compatible within the same organism. Chakrabarty invented
a process whereby two or more of these plasmids could be made com-
patible in a single cell so that one bacterium could have the capability
of breaking down several components of crude oil."
"447 U.S. 303.
4DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is the major structural component of genes and is
found in structures called chromosomes located in the nuclei of cells. Plasmids are small
circular DNA molecules that are physically separate from the chromosomes and may, by
genetic engineering techniques, readily be transferred to other cells. Joint App. to Briefs
at 40-41, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
151d.
'
6ld. at 48.
"
7Briefly described, the process in the patent application entailed the following steps:
The oil mixture to be degraded was first selected and the degradative pathways needed
in a single cell were identified. Bacteria were placed in the mixture and chosen on the
basis of selectivity, i.e., superior growth capability, and a particular strain of bacteria
was isolated. The bacteria thus selected were studied to determine if, in fact, this capa-
bility was plasmid-borne. After this had been decided, the plasmid was transferred by
conjugation (a process whereby a bacterium transfers genetic material to another bacte-
rium by cellular contact) to other cells of the same strain. These conjugatants (recipients
of the plasmids by conjugation) were then purified and checked to ensure they con-
tained the oil degradative characteristics needed. At this point a second plasmid was
transferred by the same process to the conjugatants and then treated with radiation to
cause the plasmids to fuse. The process was repeated until all the degradative pathways
needed for oil breakdown were available in one cell. Bacteria used to combat oil spills
would serve as food for aquatic life after breaking down the spill. Joint App. to Briefs at
46-48, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See generally "The New Biology,"
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Sept., 1976 at 374-75.
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It should be noted that Chakrabarty did not utilize recombinant
DNA techniques"8 in the correct sense of the term. All of the plasmid
transfers in the bacteria took place in the cells themselves or "in vivo"
rather than "in vitro" in which the splitting and recombination of
genes are handled by man outside of the cells."
ORIGINS AND APPLICATION OF TITLE 35 U.S.C. § 101
There is no common law of patents, but Congress has been granted
legislative power to issue patents by virtue of the United States Consti-
tution." There is subsequent case law upholding that power." Congress
has exercised this power by enacting patent laws which are set out in
Title 35 of the United States Code. Title 35 U.S.C. § 101 gives categor-
ies of patentable subject matter and reads as follows: "Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title." This section is derived from a series of patent leg-
islation beginning in 1790 with the first patent act and culminating in
the Patent Act of 1952 which codified the laws into Title 35 and
which is in effect today.2'
While 35 U.S.C. § 101 gives categories of statutory subject matter,
35 U.S.C. § 102 gives the conditions for patentability, including novel-
"Recombinant DNA techniques involve taking pieces of the genetic material called
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) from an organism and joining it by biochemical methods
to pieces of DNA from another organism.
[R]ecombinant DNA methods can be used to join two pieces of genes that
code for different but complementary functional properties in which one
is interested. This new combination of genes has advantageous properties
found in neither set alone. Usually the advantage is a technical one, in
that the new combination of genes allows us to isolate some of them [the
properties sought] in quantities and purities previously unattainable. D.
Jackson, Principles and Applications of Recombinant DNA Methodology,
THE RECOMBINANT DNA DEBATE, 39, 42, (1979).
"Brief for Respondent at 25-26, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
2"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, reads in its pertinent part: "The Congress shall have the
power... to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discov-
eries."
"See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933); Dr. Miles Medical
Co., v. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Railway Eng'r Co. v. Oregon Short Line
R.R. Co., 79 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1935).
"The first patent act allowed patents for any "useful art, manufacture, engine, ma-
chine, or device, or any improvement therein." A second patent act in 1793 changes the
requirements to "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter." The Consolidated Patent Act of 1870 shortened the provision to "any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof," and in the Patent Act of 1952 the word "art" was re-
placed by the word "process".
1981]
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ty and loss of right to patent. Section 103 of that same title gives addi-
tional conditions of patentability, specifically, the requirement of non-
obvious subject matter. Because of long-standing practices in the Pat-
ent Office, the words "new" and "useful" in § 101 are not usually
considered under that section but rather under the "novelty" require-
ment of § 102.28
Since initiation of patent legislation, patents have been issued to
such diverse inventions as adrenalin, 24 vitamins," hamster cells in cul-
ture, viruses for vaccines, and processes or carriers involving the use of
microorganisms.2 However, until Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court
had never addressed the question of whether a living microorganism,
standing alone, was patentable subject matter.
The terms "manufacture" and "composition of matter" in § 101
entail classes or categories of inventions that may be patented. One of
the earliest interpretations of "manufacture" was given in 1894 in
Johnson v. Johnston,' which stated that the term covered a broad
area of patentable products and included anything made by man in
art or industry that was not a process, machine, composition of matter,
or design." The word has been interpreted to cover an extensive span
of inventions but necessarily excludes other categories and classes of
inventions covered elsewhere in Title 35.
A "manufacture" as applied to patent claims cannot be something
that is simply new or never before made,2s it must have been altered
in some way so that it appears in a different and distinct form."0
American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co."' is a much cited case in dis-
cussions of what constitutes a "manufacture" under the law. The Su-
preme Court expressed in that case that an orange whose skin had
been impregnated with borax was not a "manufacture" because it did
not produce a new or different article, that is, the borax merely pro-
tected the fruit from mold and there was no change in the "name,
appearance or general character of the fruit.-12 On the other hand, a
fur treated with a chemical to enable it to be dyed by a method which
"A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 13 (2d ed. 1964). See also historical
discussion in In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1039 (Miller, J. dissenting) (C.C.P.A. 1977).
"
4Parke-Davis and Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.J. 1911), modified,
196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
'Merck and Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
'Brief for Respondent at 20-21, Diamond v. Cbakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
'60 F. 619 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1894).
uld. at 620.
"Union Paper Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 530, 563 (1874).
"Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908); Hartranft
v. Weigman, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887).
1203 U.S. 1 (1931).
"id. at 11-12.
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was before impossible was held to be a "manufacture" because it had
acquired a new appearance, quality and use."
Even though an article is made by a newly invented process it does
not necessarily follow that the article is a new "manufacture"."' It
must still meet the requisite standards of the statute. However, it has
been standard practice to issue patents on new processes for "old" arti-
cles as long as the processes are unobvious and novel." A process pat-
ent may also be allowed for an article while the article itself may be
unpatentable.
Patents for processes using live microorganisms have been allowed
for many years without any hesitation on the part of the courts." In
fact, patents on living microorganisms themselves have often been al-
lowed when in combination with a carrier material; for example, the
living organism lactic acid baccillus mixed with cocoa or chocolate has
been patented for use as a food product."
The expression "composition of matter," as used in § 101, has been
described as covering "all compositions of two or more substances,"
and as including "all composite products whether they are the result of
chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases,
fluids, powders, or solids."' " An invention may be a "composition of
matter" if it is the result of the combination of two or more substances
which produce distinctive or additional properties which the sub-
stances individually do not possess."
Patents will not be allowed on inventions if they are considered to
be "products of nature." This restriction is a judicially created stan-
dard based on the idea that the laws of nature and scientific principles
cannot be patented so that they may be available to all men to use and
enjoy.0 Illustrative of this standard of unpatentability of things that
exist in nature is Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co.' In Funk it was
held that a mixture of naturally occurring non-inhibitive strains of
bacteria were not patentable because the mixture did not cause the
"Steinfur Patents Corp. v. William Beyer, Inc., 62 F.2d 238, 240 (2d Cir. 1932).
"Cochrane v. Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1882).
11 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15 (2d ed. 1964).
"See, e.g., Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453, 455-
56 (2d Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 209 U.S. 548 (1908); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Sol-
vent Corp., 54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931), affd on lower court opinion at 61 F.2d 1041
(3rd Cir. 1932), cert denied, 288 U.S. 614 (1933).
"Brief for Respondent at 18, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
ul A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15 (2d ed. 1964).
"P.E. Sharpless Co. v. Crawford Farms, Inc., 287 F. 655, 658 (2nd Cir. 1923); Com-
mercial Acetylene Co. v. Avery Portable Lighting Co., 116 F. 907, 910 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1909).
"1 A. DELLER, DELLERBS WALKER ON PATENTS § 23 (2d ed. 1964).
'1333 U.S. 127 (1943).
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bacteria to perform in any new or different way. They acted the same
way as they did in nature without any improved use."2
In Gottschalk v. Benson"3 a patent was denied for a process to con-
vert binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals. The
Supreme Court recited that "it is conceded that one may not patent an
idea. But in practical effect that would be the result if the for-
mula..., were patented in this case.""
Prior to 1930, patents were not issued to plants because of the the-
ory that they were "products of nature." The first case so holding was
Ex parte Latimer,'5 decided in 1889. In Latimer the Commissioner of
Patents held that claims to extractions from pine needles were not pat-
entable because all Latimer had done was discover the character of the
particular pine needle. The claimant had taken no additional steps to
convert the article. The Commissioner reasoned that to allow such a
patent would be to give way to patents for "the trees of the forest and
the plants of the earth. '"46
In 1930 Congress enacted the first plant patent act to enable devel-
opers of new breeds of plants to patent their discoveries. This first act
was included in the 1952 codification in § 161 of the patent title. In
1970 the Plant Variety Protection Act"7 was enacted to extend the area
of plants that could be patented."
A recurring theme in arguments by critics of the patenting of living
microorganisms is the presumption that Congress, by adopting the
plant acts, specifically excluded living things."' Those who rely on such
arguments may do so because of a misunderstanding of a case involv-
ing the plant acts, In re Arzberger." In that case a patent for a bacte-
rium sought under the plant patent act was denied. However, a closer
reading of that case reveals the C.C.P.A. held only that the word
"plant" was to be given its common, everyday usage, not its scientific
meaning, under which some bacteria are classified as plants. It did not
hold, however, that the living nature of the bacterium made it unpa-
tentable. In the House and Senate reports behind the plant acts there is
no mention of the subject of living or non-living inventions. In those
reports the stated purpose of the laws was to give agriculture the same
"Id. at 130. It should be noted that the patent sought in Funk Bros. was for a mixture
of bacteria, not the bacteria alone.
"409 U.S. 63 (1972).
"Id. at 71.
"46 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1633 (1889).
"Id. at 1641.
47 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
43 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 190-92 (2d ed. 1964).
"91 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1362 (1975); Luckern, Ltving Organisms are not Composi-
tions or Manufactures Under 35 U.S.C. 101, 7 AM. PAT. L. ANN. Q. 236, 263 (1979).
"112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
[Vol. 2:161
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benefits afforded other industries.5 To argue that Congress intended to
exclude living subject matter by enacting the plant acts is to draw in-
ferences where there is no solid evidence on which to base them. It has
been held that the intentions of earlier Congresses should not be
guessed at by later ones.12 From an overall standpoint of the law inter-
preting § 101 it appears that if an invention is unobvious, novel, or
useful and has a distinct or new characteristic or utility, and is not a
product of nature, it may be patentable statutory subject matter.
PATENT OFFICE PROCEDURE
In order to give the reader a clearer understanding of how the
courts handle patent claims, an explanation of patent office procedure
is included here. An individual seeking a patent claim files an applica-
tion with the Patent Office which assigns the application to a Patent
Examiner. The Examiner makes the initial decision of whether the in-
vention should be patented. If the patent is rejected, the applicant may
appeal to the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals which
can either affirm or reverse the Examiner's decision. If the Board of
Appeals affirms the rejection, the applicant may take an appeal to ei-
ther a federal district court, which has original jurisdiction over patent
claims under 28 U.S.C. §1338, or to the United States Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals, on the basis of 35 U.S.C. §14.-
THE PATENTABILITY OF MICROORGANISMS:
THE C.C.P.A. DECISIONS
The C.C.P.A. first considered the question of patenting a living mi-
croorganism in In Re Bergy, the case with which In re Chakrabarty
was consolidated to be reheard. Bergy involved a patent claim for a
biologically pure culture of the microorganism Streptomyces vellosus,
which did not occur in nature in that particular form. Like Chakrabar-
ty's claim, the Patent Examiner rejected Bergy's patent to the bacte-
rium because it was a "product of nature." The Board of Appeals sus-
tained the rejection, not on the "product of nature" ground, but be-
cause the bacterium was alive. In a subsequent appeal the C.C.P.A.
reversed the denial and granted Bergy a patent, holding that the fact
that the organism was alive did not remove it from the categories of
statutory subject matter in § 10 1." The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and ordered the C.C.P.A. decision vacated and remanded for fur-
51s. REP. NO. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930), H.R. REP. NO. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1930).
"See, e.g., United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 309, 309-14 (1960).
"9 A. DELLER, DELLERS WALKER ON PATENTS § 807 (2d ed. 1964).
-In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1035 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
1981l
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ther consideration in light of Parker v. Flook, a case just decided
which the court felt would be controlling."
In Flook, the Supreme Court reversed a C.C.P.A. decision which
allowed process patent claims for use of a mathematical formula in-
volved in computer technology. The Court denied the patent because
"a claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a
specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101. "6 The
patent was rejected by the Court because the formula was merely a
scientific principle or phenomena of nature. The Court also quoted
from an earlier case in which it was stated that patent rights should
not be extended by the Court unless it had received a "clear and cer-
tain signal from Congress.
'
"57
In its reconsideration of Bergy and Chakrabarty in light of Flook,
the C.C.P.A. majority opinion could find no relevant connection be-
tween the issues in the cases. In Flook the claim was for a process
using a mathematical formula while in Bergy and Chakrabarty the
claims were to live bacteria. The only similarity between the cases was
that they all involved the question of inclusion under § 101." After
exploring all the possible reasons for which the case was remanded, the
majority of the C.C.P.A., speaking through Judge Rich, decided that
Flook had no bearing at all on the cases."
The claims presented by Bergy and Chakrabarty were considered
by the C.C.P.A. to be "industrial product[s] used in an industrial pro-
cess in a useful or technological art" 0 and accordingly no legal distinc-
tion was found between the living bacteria and the "dead" chemicals.
It was also found to be insensible to allow patents on processes for
microorganisms which use the life processes of the organisms to per-
form a particular use without allowing a claim on the living microor-
ganism itself."1 Therefore, both of the reversals of the Examiner's deci-
sions in Bergy and Chakrabarty were reaffirmed.6 1
THE PATENTABILITY OF MICROORGANISMS:
THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court described the issue in Chakrabarty as, "a nar-
row one of statutory interpretation" 6 3 -to determine if Chakrabarty's
-437 U.S. 584 (1978).
"437 U.S. at 595, n.18.
S7ld. at 596 (quoting from Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531
(1972)).
"In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 452, 464 (1979).
"Id. at 967.
"'Id. at 974.
"Id. at 977.
aid. at 955. The Government was granted certiorari to both Bergy and Chakrabarty
again, 444 U.S. 924 (1979), since then Bergy has been dismissed as moot, 444 U.S. 1028
(1980).
U447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980).
[Vol. 2:161
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bacterium fell within the classification of a "manufacture" or "compo-
sition of matter" under § 101."' Earlier cases were cited where it was
shown that both terms had previously been given their common or
dictionary definitions. References were also made to the legislative his-
tory behind the enactment of § 101 to indicate that Congress intended
for the section to cover a large range of inventions.65 Because the bac-
terium was not naturally occurring and was a direct result of Chakra-
barty's own inventiveness, the Court found that it fell within the con-
struction it had previously given the statute and was appropriately pat-
entable subject matter. In Chief Justice Burger's words, "The language
of that section fairly embraces respondent's invention."66
The majority opinion considered two of the petitioner's arguments
against the patent. In addressing the first argument in which the peti-
tioners claimed that Congress, by enacting the 1930 Plant Patent Act
and 1970 Plant Variety Act, indicated that it did not intend to include
living things as "manufactures" or "compositions of matter", the Court
asserted what it thought were the true reasons behind those acts. One
of the reasons given was that plants were generally believed to be
products of nature and therefore not patentable. Another important
factor was that many plants were not easily distinguished by the re-
quired written description of the patent laws. The new laws were nec-
essary to remedy such situations. The court rationalized that the plant
acts were not enacted to differentiate between living and non-living
subject matter but rather between products of nature and man-made
inventions. 7
The dissenting opinion shared the petitioner's view in this argument
stating that the significance of the plant acts was to enable new varie-
ties of plants, not naturally occurring, to be issued patents. However,
the dissenters reasoned that if § 101 did cover non-natural living ob-
jects the plant acts would have been completely unnecessary and
termed the majority's explanation as assuming that, "Congress was en-
gaged in either idle exercises or mere correction of the public record
when it enacted the 1930 and 1970 Acts. "68
The second argument set out by the Commissioner of Patents was
also rejected by the Court. This argument asserted that patents on liv-
ing microorganisms should not be allowed without express statutory
authority. The Commissioner supported its view on the basis that ge-
netic engineering was unforeseen when the patent laws were drafted.
"The novelty or unobviousness as required by 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 of the invention
was not in issue, 447 U.S. at 307, n.5.
"447 U.S. at 308.
"Id. at 318.
"Id. at 312.
"Id. at 320. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19811
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In answer to this the court stated that although it is the function of
Congress to enact laws, it is the Court's duty to interpret those laws.
Accordingly, the majority found that when § 101 was written many
new technologies were unforeseen which have since been patented.
Furthermore, the drafters of the law necessarily used broad, expansive
language to cover such unforeseeables 9 As to their seemingly contra-
dictory statement in Parker v. Flook that, "we must proceed cautiously
when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unfore-
seen by Congress", 70 the court explained that in Flook the patent claim
was construed to be an "idea" and therefore unpatentable because of
the established doctrine that ideas cannot be patented. The court re-
jected the contention that the statement in Flook made technologies
unforeseen by Congress at the drafting of § 101 "unpatentable per
se".71 Again the dissenting judges agreed with the Commissioner and
stated that the majority's decision did indeed extend patent protection
into areas that Congress did not intend to cover.7
The Commissioner attemped to reinforce its arguments by includ-
ing an amicus prepared by the People's Business Commission" which
illustrated what the court called "a gruesome parade of horribles"" in
an effort to demonstrate the risks associated with recombinant DNA
research. The majority thought that it was not within its realm to con-
sider the genetic research controversies set out in the amicus, stating
that such considerations are a "matter of high policy for resolution
within the legislative process.""6 It was also pointed out that even if
Chakrabarty's claim were rejected, it was not likely to put an end to
genetic research.
ANALYSIS
In deciding the issue in Chakrabarty the Supreme Court was faced
with a question of first impression in which only two practical solu-
tions were available. The Court could have either allowed the claim
for the bacteria as falling under the statutory categories of § 101 or set
a new judicial precedent for denying patents to articles that meet the
requirements of statutory subject matter, but which are alive.
The Court chose to use the first solution in deciding the case, based
on prior case law interpreting what constitutes a "manufacture" or
"composition of matter". This decision is sure to raise a considerable
amount of fervor in the genetic research controversy, an area already
Old. at 315.
"Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978).
"1447 U.S. at 316.
"Id. at 319.
"A consumer group based in Washington, D.C.
74447 U.S. at 316.
"Id. at 316.
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tense with fear. When genetic engineering is mentioned many ques-
tions of considerable magnitude arise. Issues of morality, social consid-
eration, and legal consequences are but a few that surround the sub-
ject. Genetic technology is a rapidly expanding industry that is fast
becoming a significant part of the commercial world. Companies that
specialize solely in genetic technology have developed in the past few
years"' and major pharmaceutical and chemical companies are begin-
ning to venture into the business. If such industry continues to prosper
the impact on the nation as a whole and especially on its economy
could be of great significance.
The beneficial applications of genetic technology are notable. Re-
searchers have already discovered ways to artificially mass produce
many medicinal substances by the use of genetic engineering on bacte-
ria. Such substances include insulin, human growth hormone, and in-
terferon, which, until now, have been extracted from animals or hu-
mans by involved mechanisms at high costs. By developing ways that
these drugs can be manufactured at low costs and in great quantities,
many diseases, before difficult or impossible to treat, can be brought
under control. Foreseeable also are great advances in the treatment of
incurable genetic diseases such as sickle cell anemia and Down's Syn-
drome." The advantages of genetic technology extend likewise into the
areas of agriculture and energy where new methods for improved
crops and new fuels are under study.7"
The argument most expressed against genetic engineering is the
fear that a potentially lethal organism will escape from some laborato-
ry and infect human beings. This fear is not totally ungrounded. Chak-
rabarty himself once felt it was necessary to destroy a bacteria he had
manufactured in his lab.79 Also, others opposed to genetic research
have stated fear that the gene pool of the entire world could be seri-
ously affected by tampering with DNA. They are afraid normal pat-
terns of evolution will be changed to a dangerous extent." But these
considerations must be weighed against the potential benefits by all of
society.
An example of one of the benefits that genetic research may bring
is the production of interferon by artifical means. This substance has
been shown useful in combating a large variety of virus infections, and
has been extremely promising in fighting cancer. So promising in fact
'Genetech, a San Fransisco firm engaged solely in genetic technology, has developed
from a one million dollar business in 1976 to a sixty-five million dollar business today.
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORTS, June 30, 1980 at 34-35.
7id.
73ld.
"Wade, Dicing with Nature: Three Narrow Escapes, 195 SCIENCE 378 (1977).
"Kiley, Learning to Live with the Living Invention, 7 AM PAT. L. ANN. Q. 220, 231,
(1979).
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that the United States government has spent millions of dollars for re-
search on it. However, a major obstacle to widespread use of interferon
exists in the amazingly high cost of its manufacture by conventional
means. The cost of a single gram of interferon can go as high as a
million dollars. The production of interferon by genetically made bac-
teria could reduce the cost to a practical level to allow all of society to
benefit from it.8"
Intriguing legal questions are raised when one considers a hypo-
thetical situation in which a disease-producing microorganism did es-
cape and infect humans: who would be potentially liable for tort
claims arising from the injuries? In cases of large groups of the popula-
tion becoming ill, how would damages be assessed and who would
have to pay? Tort law as we know it today would have to be reassessed
in light of such considerations. 2
One may reasonably ask why Chakrabarty felt it necessary to take
his patent claim to the highest court of the nation when the Patent
Examiner had already allowed his claims to the process for making the
bacteria and for the bacteria plus a carrier material. The answer is
based on the nature of the invention. Because they are living orga-
nisms, the bacteria can and will multiply in the right growth medium.
All one would have to do to obtain it would be to go to a site where it
is being used on an oil spill and "scoop up a tablespoon and grow their
own batch." 8' Additionally, products of microbiological process patents
are required by law to be placed in national culture collections so that
they may be available to the public.8' Anyone could simply go to the
nearest depository, "check out" a sample of a particular microorga-
nism, let it grow and reproduce and engage its particular functions to
their own use without ever infringing on a process patent."
Since patents can now issue on live organisms some fear that higher
life forms will in the future be patented. This idea is rather unlikely to
come about because of the difficulty in higher life forms being suffi-
ciently described, as required by the patent laws. For those who think
one day that even humans could be genetically engineered, conceiv-
ably, the basic human rights set out in the Constitution would prevent
such from ever being patented."
'
1B. Davis, Evolution, Epidemiology and Recombinant DNA, THE RECOMBINANT
DNA DEBATE, 139 (1979).
9R. Dworkin, Biocatastrophe and the Law: Legal Aspects of Recombinant DNA Re-
search, THE RECOMBINANT DNA DEBATE, 219 (1979).
"NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1980, at 74.
uIn re Argoudelis, 434 F. 2d 1890 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
"Kiley, Learning to Live with the Living Invention, 7 AM. PAT. L. ANN. Q. 220, 224
(1979).
'Luckern, Living Organisms are not Compositions or Manufactures under 35
U.S.C. §101, 7 AM. PAT L. ANN. Q. 236, 262 (1979).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in holding that Chakrabarty's bacterium was
patentable subject matter under § 101, made the only decision possible
without subtracting from the applicable patent laws. The bacteria fit
precisely into every category necessary for a patent. It was not natural-
ly occurring; it was new and unobvious; and it had acquired a new
name, character and use. The only obstacle in the Court's way was the
fact that it was alive. The Court felt this was not a great enough bar-
rier to warrant denying the patent. This decision will likely spur com-
mercial interest in the field of genetic technology but will probably
have minimal effect on the scientific community, which would have
continued its research regardless of the outcome of the case. In any
event, if Congress so chooses, it may still enact legislation curtailing
aspects of genetic research or increase the strictness of the federal reg-
ulations that control it.
Ruth Rawls Harris

